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The Mathew 0. Tobriner Memorial Lecture
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 Revisited
by
JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN*
On April 9, 1866, the Congress of the United States enacted into law
the first civil rights bill in the history of the country. Among other
things it declared:
That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any for-
eign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citi-
zens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color,
without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary ser-
vitude... shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the
United States to make and enforce contracts; to sue, be parties and give
evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceed-
ings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white
citizens .... 2
This act, now known as the Civil Rights Act of 1866, made significant
contributions to the difficult transition of African Americans from slav-
ery to freedom in the post-Civil War years.a
The first challenge the Act received was from the President of the
United States, Andrew Johnson, who, in his strongly worded veto
message, denied both the propriety and constitutionality of the Act. He
declared,
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context of law, the underlying moral value of our American society, I think, is the protection
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I. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (reenacted by Enforcement Act of 1870, ch.
114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (1870) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (1987)).
2. Id.§1.
3. See, e.g., J. BLAINE, TWENTY YEARS IN CONGRESS 179-180 (1884); E. FONER, RE-
CONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-77 118-119, 243-247 (1988).
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it is now proposed by a single legislative enactment to confer the rights
of citizens upon all persons of African descent, born within the ex-
tended limits of the United States, while persons of foreign birth, who
make our land their home, must undergo a probation of five years, and
can only then become citizens upon proof that they are "of good moral
character, attached to the principles of the Constitution ... and well
disposed to the good order and happiness of the same.
'" 4
Had the President known his history he would have been aware that
persons of African descent had been on probation in this country for
more than two centuries; and under the careful tutelage of their deeply
religious white owners they must have been of high moral character and
unquestionably loyal.
Johnson further argued that the Constitution did not confer on Con-
gress the power to make rules to regulate the acts of the states.5 He
seemed unaware of the power, conferred on the Congress by the thir-
teenth amendment, to enforce the provision that neither slavery nor in-
voluntary servitude shall exist in the United States. The testimony before
the Joint Committee on Reconstruction contained ample evidence of the
efforts of former slave owners to reclaim their former slaves by a series of
state laws and policies against which the former slaves were helpless.
6
In subsequent years the Act continued to play a role in defining the
status of black Americans in the states and the nation. When Congress
revised the United States Code in 1874, it continued to regard the Act as
an important factor in the protection of the rights of freedmen. Thus, the
principal provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 became section 1981
of the Revised United States Code. 7 And the revisers went so far as to
cite judicial interpretations of the 1866 Act. In the Matter of Turner, 8 for
example, Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, on circuit, held that an inden-
ture of a black apprentice to a white employer had violated the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 when the contract failed to include the guarantee that
she be taught to read, when the state law required that white apprentices
be taught to read. 9 This affirmed what Senator Lyman Trumbull as-
serted on April 4, 1866 when the Civil Rights Act was under considera-
tion: "To be a citizen of the United States carries with it some rights;
4. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist Sess. 1679 (1866).
5. Id. at 1680. See also E. FONER, supra note 3, at xix-xxvii; Sullivan, Historical Recon-
structions, Reconstruction History, and the Proper Scope of Section 1981, 98 YALE L.J. 541
(1989).
6. For a detailed account of The Civil Rights Act of 1866, the President's veto message,
and the votes in the Congress to override, see E. MCPHERSON, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES DURING THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION 74-81 (1880). See also ROB-
ERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL
COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS 1-20 (1985).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
8. In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247).
9. Id. at 337-38.
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and what are they?" Trumbull asked. Answering his own question, he
said, "They are those inherent, fundamental rights which belong to free
citizens or free men in all countries, such as the rights enumerated in this
bill, and they belong to them in all the States of the Union."10
Over the years the Civil Rights Act was never successfully chal-
lenged in the courts. Shortly after its passage, it upheld the right of a
black woman to ride in the first class car as provided for by the ticket she
held." In 1872, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Act by declaring that it was intended to protect blacks from the
"prejudices [that] existed against the colored race, which naturally af-
fected the administration of justice in the State courts, and operated
harshly when one of that race was a party accused .... [The Act] ex-
tends to both races the same rights, and the same means of vindicating
them."' 12 The courts provided an interpretation of the even-handed na-
ture of the Act by insisting that it secured the rights of whites as well as
blacks.1
3
As the years passed, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 came to be re-
garded as a fundamental part of the mechanism that Congress had con-
structed, and that the federal judicial system had upheld to protect the
rights of all citizens regardless of race. Neither the United States Code,
new legislation, nor judicial interpretation, dislodged it from its secure
position as a veritable bulwark in the protection of the rights of citizens.
The Civil Rights Act of 1875 was declared unconstitutional in 1883, but
the status of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was not affected. 14 The Civil
Rights Act of 196415 was passed with no intention of having it regarded
as a replacement of the Act of 1866. One was broad and general and
spoke to the overall condition of citizens of the United States. The other
was direct and specific and addressed acute problems facing African
Americans as they sought to make their way through the maze of prac-
tices, customs, traditions, and even laws that impeded their everyday
functions and activities.1 6 Even when the Congress was considering key
amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it addressed and rejected
10. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1757 (1866).
11. Stevens v. Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac R.R. Co., Judge John C. Under-
wood Papers, Scrapbook 193, 203, 205, 227, Library of Congress.
12. Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581, 593 (1871).
13. United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785, 793 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866) (No. 16,151).
14. See Robinson & Wife v. Memphis & Charleston R.R. Co., 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
15. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. %% 1971,
1975a-1975e, 2000e-2000e-16 (1986)).
16. For a discussion of both the 1866 and the 1964 Civil Rights Acts at the time the 1964
Act was under consideration see 24 CONG. REC. 7492 (1964). One Representative, Robert
N.C. Nix of Pennsylvania, said that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was "mild" when compared
with the Act of 1866. Id.
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proposals to eliminate recourse to section 1981 in the area of employ-
ment discrimination.1
7
A recent affirmation of the importance and validity of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 was in the landmark case of Runyon v. McCrary18
decided in 1976. Michael McCrary, an African American child, had
been denied admission to a private day care facility in Virginia solely on
the basis of his race.' 9 His parents filed an action in the federal. district
court based on that portion of the United States Code incorporating the
principal provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. When the matter
reached the United States Supreme Court, that body ruled that the Mc-
Crarys could use that statute to seek redress for harm caused from racial
discrimination by private actions.20 In an eloquent and, at times, moving
opinion from which Justices Byron White and William Rehnquist dis-
sented, Justice Potter Stewart stated that the claim of the schools that
section 1981 does not reach private acts of discrimination was wholly
inconsistent with the Court's understanding of the legislative history of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866.21 This was an interpretation that had been
reaffirmed by the Court. He said that the Court had repeatedly stressed
that "while parents have a constitutional right to send their children to
private schools and a constitutional right to select private schools that
offer specialized instruction, they have no constitutional right to provide
their children with private school education unfettered by reasonable
governmental regulation. ' 22 Making certain that schools did not exclude
children solely on racial grounds was an example of "reasonable govern-
ment regulation."'23
The decision in Runyon was widely viewed as a significant step in
the direction of moving the nation toward the elimination of racial dis-
crimination and, indeed, toward a broad usage of section 1981 in accom-
plishing that goal. The Court, following the decision in Runyon,
continued to give meaning to the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and at no time
did it even hint at a retreat from its 1976 decision to reach all intentional
racial discrimination, public and private, that interfered with the right to
contract.24 Meanwhile, Congress viewed the decision in Runyon as being
consonant with its own views and intentions. Consequently, it rejected
17. See, e.g., 118 CONG. REC. 3371-73 (1972) (remarks by Senator Harrison Williams of
New Jersey, Feb. 9, 1972, and vote of the Senate rejecting an amendment that would have
excluded Section 1981 as a remedy against employment discrimination).
18. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
19. Id. at 163-64.
20. Id. at 168-75.
21. Id. at 173.
22. Id. at 178.
23. Id. at 179.
24. See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987); Saint Francis College v. Al-
Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987); General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375
(1981).
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efforts to pass legislation designed to overrule or limit the reach of judi-
cial interpretation, and it declined to change the judicial interpretation in
the course of enacting or amending related legislation which reflected the
awareness on the part of Congress of that interpretation.
25
It came as a distinct jolt, therefore, when a case involving alleged
racial discrimination in the workplace, Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union,26 was the occasion for the Court's expressed desire to reconsider
the decision in Runyon v. McCrary.27 This decision to reconsider oc-
curred when the two dissenters in Runyon, White and Rehnquist, were
joined by the three new members of the Court, O'Connor, Scalia, and
Kennedy, and voted to reconsider Runyon.2 8 Immediately, a veritable
firestorm of criticism spread to every part of the country as numerous
requests literally poured into Washington that the Court should not over-
rule Runyon while considering the new case before it, Patterson v. Mc-
Lean Credit Union.29
Brenda Patterson, a black woman, was hired in 1972 as a teller and
file coordinator in the McLean Credit Union of Winston-Salem, North
Carolina.3 0 From that time until her termination some ten years later
she alleged that she was consistently harassed, was the victim of racial
slurs by her supervisor, was required to perform menial tasks not re-
quired of white employees of similar rank, and received no information
regarding openings or promotions to a higher rank.31 In the year imme-
diately prior to her termination she was even denied merit raises.32 Pat-
terson contended that her treatment constituted racial discrimination in
violation of section 1981 of Title 42 of the United States Code. She sued
for damages for mental anguish, mental and emotional distress, as well as
for attorney's fees, claiming the actions of her employer were "willful,
wanton, intentional, malicious, and in total disregard" of her rights.
33
25. See, e.g., Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986) (holding that damages awarded
may not reflect fully the public benefit advanced by civil rights actions, thus Congress recog-
nized that reasonable attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 need not be proportionate to an
award of money damages); Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) (holding that a federal court
could enjoin actions of a state magistrate under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S.
678 (1978) (authorizing attorney's fee awards in civil rights actions payable by the states when
their officials are successfully sued in their official capacity).
26. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
27. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
28. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617 (1988) (decision to hear argument
on reconsideration of Runyon v. McCrary).
29. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
30. Id. at 2368-69.
31. Id. at 2391.
32. Ia at 2373.
33. See Brief for Petitioner at 12 (14th of Level 1), Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989) (No. 87-107).
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It is unlikely that Patterson could have anticipated or even imagined
that she would receive the support that now seemed to come from every
direction. Perhaps not even counsel could have predicted the outrage
that the legal profession, and much of the socially sensitive sector of the
community, felt upon learning that the Court wished now to reconsider
its own decision in Runyon. Both counsel and plaintiff must have been
greatly impressed when they learned of the large number of individuals
and organizations that were filing briefs, as friends of the Court, in sup-
port of Patterson's complaint. Among those who filed were: sixty-five
members of the United States Senate and 118 members of the United
States House of Representatives; the attorneys general of all the states
except Arizona, South Carolina, and Utah; the Solicitor General of the
United States; a group of forty civil rights and civic organizations; an-
other cluster of 116 organizations; a group of historians; and numerous
professional organizations including the American Bar Association, the
National Bar Association, the Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights
Under Law, and the Association of the Bar of the City of New York.
34
Among the civic and religious organizations were the American Jewish
Congress, the NAACP, the Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai B'Rith,
the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, People for
the American Way, Common Cause, and numerous others.
35
The defendant (the respondent) had some supporters, though much
fewer in number. There were seven members of the House of Represent-
atives, including Jack Kemp, Norman Shumway, Henry Hyde, and Don-
ald Lukens; United States Senators Jesse Helms, Gordon J. Humphrey,
and Steve Syms; and groups such as the Washington Legal Foundation,
the Center for Civil Rights, the Equal Employment Advisory Council,
and the Lincoln Institute for Research and Education. 36 The thrust of
their argument was that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was "designed to
eradicate state action that deprives blacks of contractual liberty and to
invest in blacks the legal capacity to make and enforce contracts, not to
reach purely private actions such as refusals to enter into contracts. ' ' 37
34. See Briefs as Amici Curiae for Petitioner, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S.
Ct. 2363 (1989) (No. 87-107).
35. Id.
36. The following is a complete list of the organizations who submitted briefs as amici
curiae in support of respondent, McLean Credit Union: Allied Education Foundation, Center
for Civil Rights, Equal Employment Advisory Council, The Lincoln Institute for Research
and Education, and the Washington Legal Foundation. As well, the following individuals
submitted briefs on behalf of the respondent: J. Philip Anderagg, Congressmen Robert E. Bad-
ham, William E. Dannemeyer, Henry J. Hyde, Jack F. Kemp, Donald E. "Buz" Lukens, Nor-
man D. Shumway, Robert S. Walker, and George Wortley; Senators Jesse Helms, Gordon J.
Humphrey, and Steve Symms. See Briefs Amici Curiae for Respondent, Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989) (No. 87-107).
37. Brief of the Center for Civil Rights as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at
424, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989) (No. 87-107).
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The principal objective of those who filed briefs in support of Patter-
son was to persuade the Court not to overrule Runyon. First, they ar-
gued that the decision in Runyon was based- on a sound and accurate
reading of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Many of them, including the
historians and the attorneys general, insisted that the post-Civil War ex-
periences of the freedmen prompted the Congress to enact legislation
designed to eliminate racial harassment, terror, discrimination in the
workplace, and all other forms of racial discrimination at that time and
in future times. 38 they provided vivid descriptions of the numerous
ways by which former slaveholders sought to withhold property and civil
rights from their former slaves.39 In hearings conducted in the months
shortly after the end of the Civil War, the Joint Congressional Commit-
tee on Reconstruction was shocked to learn of the physical .violence,
price fixing, lifetime contracts, and exorbitant rent and food charges that
were equivalent to any wages the former slaves might earn.4° As the
Committee's Report noted, "There is a disposition on the part of [white]
citizens to secure, as far as possible, the same control over the freedmen
by contracts which [the whites] possessed. when they held them as
slaves." 4
1
This desire for continued control over the freedmen found expres-
sion in the so-called black codes enacted by the legislatures in the former
Confederate states in 1865-1866.42 These laws imposed special controls
over blacks with no visible means of support, over black children who
were apprenticed to white employers-preferably to their former
whites-and especially in their movements as well as their employ-
ment.43 But the racially discriminatory laws were not the sole problem
prompting the enactment of civil rights legislation in 1866. The hearings
before the Joint Committee 'did not focus on racially discriminatory laws
or even the discriminatory legal process. Rather, the focus was on the
abuses by private white landowners.44 These were the persons who com-
mitted the most numerous acts violating the basic rights of their former
slaves. Consequently, it was most important that there be effective legis-
lation to reach private individuals. The matter came up both in private
discussion as well as public debate when the Civil Rights Act was under
38. Brief of Eric Foner, John H. Franklin, Louis R. Harlan, Stanley N. Katz, Leon F.
Litwack, C. Vann Woodward and Mary Frances Berry as Amicus Curiae for Petitioner at 265-
67, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989) (No. 87-107).
39. Id. at 263-65.
40. REPORT OF THE JOINT CoMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUcTION, 39TH CONG., 1ST SEss.,
pt. ii at 228, pt. iii at 80 (1866).
41. Id. pt. ii at 123. See also, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1865, at 1, col. 2; N.Y. Times, August
1, 1865, at 1, col. 1.
42. See Sullivan, supra note 5, at 555.
43. J. FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 32-53 (1961).
44. See Sullivan, supra note 5, at 555.
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consideration in 1866.45 When he spoke on the Civil Rights Bill which
he had introduced in the House, Representative James F. Wilson of Iowa
summed it up when he said that since states had failed to protect the
personal rights of many Americans, "we must do our duty by supplying
the protection which the states deny .... Whatever these great funda-
mental rights are, we must be invested with power to legislate for their
protection or our Constitution fails in the first and most important office
of government.
'46
There is much force in the argument that the Congress enacted the
Civil Rights Act in 1866 to displace state law in order to protect the civil
rights of all citizens, not merely to provide equal rights under state law.
As is clear in section one of the Act and as the historians made clear in
their brief in support of Patterson, the law "supplanted state statutes re-
lating to citizenship to the extent that it conferred citizenship on all per-
sons born or naturalized in the United States and not subject to any
foreign power (except for Indians not taxed). States no longer could
deny the status of citizenship to such persons."'47 It also enumerated the
rights to be guaranteed on the same basis as white citizens who were, of
course, the most favored in this regard a.4  It is both interesting and im-
portant to note that the law did not explicitly grant federal court jurisdic-
tion to remove legal disabilities in state law, which is an indication that
Congress did not merely intend to confer under the Act a right to non-
discriminatory state laws. Thus, the framers intended to enforce rights
secured by the United States Constitution and not simply an equality in
state-conferred rights. They left no question that they intended to apply
federal authority over civil rights to private individuals.
49
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 undertook, moreover, to give sub-
stance and meaning to the thirteenth amendment. The amendment did
not merely eliminate the badges of slavery, important as that was. The
framers of the amendment viewed the prohibition of slavery as an affirm-
ative guarantee of liberty to all Americans. 50 They regarded the liberty
guaranteed by the amendment as including all rights to life, liberty, and
property. Congress equated this status and these rights with the status
and rights of United States citizenship. While the first section of the
Civil Rights Act enumerated some of the rights involved, it did not claim
45. See E. FONER, supra note 3, at 199-201; L. LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM SO
LONG: THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY 364-71 (1980).
46. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1118 (1866).
47. See Brief of Amicus Curiae for Petitioner, supra note 38, at 265-67.
48. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
49. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 436-37 (1968). See also CONG. GLOBE.
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 601 (1866) (remarks by Senator Thomas A. Hendricks of Indiana who, in
opposing certain provisions of the 1866 Act, made it clear that the Act would extend to private
individuals who violated its provisions).
50. See Sullivan, supra note 5, at 561-64.
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that its list was definitive. Representative Samuel Shellabarger' of Ohio
made this clear when he observed, "I do not understand that there is now
any serious doubt anywhere as to our power to admit by law to the rights
of American citizenship entire classes or races who were born and con-
tinue to reside in our territory .... -5 1 Consequently, there could not be
any doubt as to the right of Congress to confer citizenship on all native
born people. The effect of the bill was not to confer or regulate rights,
"but to require that whatever... rights and obligations are imposed by
State laws shall be for and upon all citizens alike without distinctions
based on race or former condition in slavery."
'52
When the Court indicated in 1987 that it wished to reconsider the
decision in Runyon, it could hardly have anticipated the avalanche of
criticism that it would provoke on the part of historians, lawyers, civic
and labor groups, and civil rights organizations. Nor could it have pre-
dicted the legal and historical scholarship that its desire to reconsider
Runyon would stimulate. Not since the Court's 1953 order to reargue
Brown v. Board of Education 53 had so many historians been dispatched
to reexamine a period in American history to discover the intent and
reasons for congressional action. In the process, many lawyers displayed
their mettle as historians. While the principle of stare decisis is, indeed,
the fuel that drives the engine leading to many legal decisions, the
Court's challenge of Runyon seemed to many lawyers unnecessarily pro-
vocative. To them the Court's position not only called into question the
soundness of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 but, perhaps even more criti-
cally, the careful effort on the part of vast numbers of Americans, includ-
ing many lawyers and judges, to create a better climate and a more
constructive approach to the resolution of the problem of race in the
United States.
The forty-seven state attorneys general and the chief legal officers
for Guam, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands,; and the District of Columbia
were particularly incensed over the Court's willingness to reconsider, al-
most cavalierly, what the attorneys general considered established law.54
It was they who pointed out that the five-member majority voting to re-
consider Runyon was comprised of Runyon's dissenters and the three
51. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1293 (1866).
52. Id.
53. 345 U.S. 972 (1953).
54. See Brief of the States of New York, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisi-
ana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyo-
ming and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, Guam, and the Virgin
Islands as Amicus Curiae for Petitioner, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363
(1989) (No. 87-107).
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members subsequently appointed to the Court.55 They regarded this as
"especially noteworthy" and declared that the principles of stare decisis
were therefore "particularly compelling here."' 56 In language which most
historians would be too timid to use, the lawyers said: "Though neither
the parties to this action nor the Solicitor General had urged a reexami-
nation of Runyon, this Court sua sponte has suggested that the protec-
tions against racial, ethnic and religious discrimination that section 1981
affords might well be discarded."' 57 They feared that by embarking on
this course, the Court could cause substantial institutional and societal
injury, because up to that time "the law of section 1981 has been settled
to the satisfaction of the people as expressed by their elected officials and
no compelling reason has appeared to upset it."58
The attorneys general then elaborated on their argument that only
the most compelling circumstances could justify the Court's "Abandon-
ment of Firmly Established Statutory Precedents Since Congress Is Free
to Correct Precedents That Are Wrong." 59 While the attorneys general
were convinced that a fresh look at the Act and its historical context and
legislative history would compel the conclusion that section 1981 was
valid and reached private discrimination, they also believed that such an
exercise as reconsideration of Runyon would inflict injury to society and
the judicial system. In a society governed by the rule of law, the doctrine
of stare decisis demands respect, they insisted.6° If, therefore, the Court
declined the opportunity to consider long-held views about the reach of a
statute, it "would remove doubts about the continued vitality of other
decisions construing similar statutory commands. ' 61
If anything, the American Bar Association was even more equivocal
than the attorneys general in its support of the principle of stare decisis
and in its opposition to overruling Runyon. As if its rather recent em-
brace of the principle of racial equality would make amends for the many
years that it excluded African Americans from membership, 62 the Amer-
ican Bar Association declared in its brief that for many years it has taken
"a strong position opposing racial discrimination within its own organi-
zation, within other institutions of the legal system, and in society at
large."' 63 It then argued that for two decades the commitment of the
55. Id. at 311.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 309.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 310.
60. Id. (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 311 (1983)).
61. Id. at 312.
62. See R. KRUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 131, 221, 546 (1976).
63. Motion for Leave to File and Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus Cu-
riae in Support of Petitioner at 193, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989)
(No. 87-107).
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United States "has been reflected in and served by the application of 42
U.S.C. section 1981 to prohibit private acts of discrimination in the mak-
ing and enforcement of contracts." 64 Therefore,
Runyon confirmed a principle of racial justice already well established
and placed it beyond question .... Runyon thus confirmed an inter-
pretation of section 1981 that had already received the Court's impri-
matur and had been- applied for sei'eral years in the courts.
Furthermore, the values underlying the doctrine of stare decisis
,strongly militate against reconsideration of Runyon.6
5
These were essentially the arguments advanced by the supporters of
the Petitioner, Brenda Patterson. The reexamination of the conditions
surrounding the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 persuaded
them that the Congress enacted the statute in order to protect allpersons
from the reach of private discrimination and to extend to all citizens the
rights enjoyed by the most favored of all its citizens, the white people of
the United States. It was this same reexamination that persuaded the
petitioner's supporters to speak out against the reconsideration of the
well established principle of stare decisis because' it would undermine
public confidence in the rulings of the Court.
In our own time we have seen a variety of public demonstrations in
Washington and elsewhere igainst and in favor of Supreme Court deci-
sions already rendered. There have also been demonstrations attempting
to influence the decisions of justices in cases before the Court. Many
would regard such displays of sentiment as improper, at best, and at
worst, lacking in any understanding of the Court's presumed insensitivity
to public pressures. There remain many among us who believe, with Mr.
Dooley, that the Supreme Court does follow the election returns.66
There remain, however, the purists who subscribe to the view that the
justices, in reaching their decisions, are influenced only by their learning
and their own consciences. 67
64. Id at 195.
65. Id. at 196. The American Bar Association filed its brief over the protest of counsel
for the McLean Credit Union on'the ground that the President of the Association had not
cleared the brief with the governing body, and, therefore, could not speak for the Association.
The President of the Association, Robert McCrate, insisted that he had indeed been authorized
to file the brief, although at no time did he argue that the brief represented the views of the
347,000 members of the American Bar Association. See Respondent's Opposition to Motion of
the American Bar Association for Leave to File a Brief Amicus Curiae at 416, Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989) (No. 87-107); Reply Memorandum of the Amer-
ican Bar Association in Support of Its Motion for Leave to File a Brief Amicus Curiae at 420,
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989) (No. 87-107).
66. Mr. Dooley said, "No matther whither th' Constitution follows th' flag or not, th'
Supreme Court follows th' illiction returns." MR. DOOLEY AT His BEST 77 (E. Ellis ed.
1938).
67. R. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLEURALIST DEMOCRACY (1982).
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One is tempted to wonder what influence, if any, the amicus briefs,
filed by hundreds of persons representing many thousands in behalf of
Brenda Patterson, had on the members of the United States Supreme
Court. After all, it was the majority of the Court calling for a reconsider-
ation of Runyon that caused many lawyers and laymen to submit the
briefs arguing that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was not only constitu-
tional but well established law. When Justice Kennedy spoke for the
Court in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union on June 15, 1989, he stated
that some members of the Court believe that Runyon was decided incor-
rectly while others "consider it correct on its own footing, but the ques-
tion before us is whether it ought now to be overturned. We conclude
after reargument that Runyon should not be overruled, and we now reaf-
firm that section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in the making and
enforcement of private contracts. '68
Regarding the principle of stare decisis, Justice Kennedy insisted
that the Court's precedents were not sacrosanct and that it had "over-
ruled prior decisions where the necessity and propriety of doing so has
been established."' 69 But, he hastened to add, "any departure from the
doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification."' 70 The Court
found no special justification for overruling Runyon. Consequently, it let
the case stand. The decision in Runyon, Justice Kennedy asserted, is
"entirely consistent with our society's deep commitment to the eradica-
tion of discrimination based on a person's race or the color of his or her
skin."' 71 One is tempted to ask the question as to whether the merits in
Runyon existed the previous year when the Court voted to reconsider it
or whether the amicus briefs assisted the Court in reaching the decision
that Runyon should not be overruled. Justice Kennedy's affirmations
sounded very much like those made by those friends of the Court who
filed briefs in Patterson. He and his colleagues must have already known
that the decision in Runyon was consistent with the nation's commitment
to eradicate racial discrimination. To make such a statement in 1989
that they were unwilling to make in 1988 inevitably opened up the possi-
bility of interpreting the Court's new position as one that had been influ-
enced by public pressure. This is an interpretation that, if tempting, is
also revolting.
It remained for the Court to decide whether the conduct of which
the petitioner, Patterson, complained falls within the enumerated rights
protected by section 1981. In recognizing that the section forbids dis-
crimination in the making and enforcement of contracts, Justice Ken-
nedy added that section 1981 did not provide a general proscription of
68. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2369.
69. Id. at 2370.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2371.
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racial discrimination in all aspects of contract relations, "for it expressly
prohibits discrimination only in the makirng and enforcement of con-
tracts."' 72 Justice Kennedy declared that the right to make contracts
does not extend to conduct by the employer after the contract has been
established, including breach of the terms of the contract or imposition of
discriminatory working conditions.73 As far as harassment was con-
cerned, petitioner was not entitled to relief under the statute. "This type
of conduct, reprehensible though it be if true, is not actionable under
§ 1981, which covers only conduct at the initial formation of the contract
and conduct which impairs the right to enforce contract obligations
through legal process." 74
The Court asserted that the conduct of which the petitioner com-
plained was actionable under "the more expansive reach of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... .- 75 The Court went on to explain:
[b]y reading Section 1981 not as a general proscription of racial dis-
crimination in all aspects of contract relations, but as limited to the
enumerated rights within its express protection, specifically the right to
make and enforce contracts, we may preserve the integrity of Title
VII's procedures without sacrificing any significant coverage of the
civil rights laws.
76
It is not clear what effect the reconsideration of Runyon had on the
majority of the Court in the Patterson case. If the reconsideration in-
volved looking once more at the circumstances surrounding the passage
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 the members would, it seems, have appre-
ciated the special attention that the Congress gave to protecting the
freedmen from the intimidation, harassment, and even terror of their for-
mer owners. Far from providing narrow protection, the Act was
designed to create a veritable shield against a variety of mistreatments
which Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was not intended to be.
As Justice Brennan said in his dissent, the Court ignored "powerful his-
torical evidence about the Reconstruction Congress' concerns,... bol-
stering its parsimonious rendering by reference to a statute enacted
nearly a century after § 1981, and plainly not intended to affect its
reach." 7
7
Perhaps the most difficult part of the Court's decision in Patterson to
reconcile with the Act of 1866 and with subsequent decisions is its insis-
tence that section 1981 covers no post-formation conduct in contractual
relations. Thus, the Court says that even if Patterson was protected in
her rights on the day the contract was made, there was no protection
72. Id. at 2372.
73. Id. at 2372-73.
74. Id. at 2374 (emphasis added).
75. Id. at 2374.
76. Id. at 2375.
77. Id. at 2379.
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extended by section 1981 on the day following the making of the con-
tract. 78 When the Court insisted that Patterson could obtain relief from
post-formation conduct under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
that was another way of saying that no such relief was available until
196479. This ignored completely the legislative history of the Act of
1866, the conditions that brought forth the Act, and the relief it has pro-
vided for more than 124 years. As Justice Brennan pointed out, "The
Court's use of Title VII is not only question-begging; it is also mislead-
ing. Section 1981 is a statute of general application, extending not just to
employment contracts but to all contracts." 80 Justice Stevens added that
it is difficult to discern why an employer who does not decide to treat
black employees less favorably than white employees until after the
contract of employment is first conceived is any less guilty of discrimi-
nating in the "making" of a contract .... An at-will employee, such
as petitioner, is not merely performing an existing contract; she is con-
stantly remaking that contract. Whenever significant new duties are
assigned to the employee-whether they better or worsen the relation-
ship, the contract is amended and a new contract is made .... A
deliberate policy of harassment of black employees who are competing
with white citizens is, I submit, manifest discrimination in the making
of contracts .... 81
It would not be too much to say that the Court did not revisit the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 as so many friends of the Court requested it to
do. Had it done so, it would have appreciated the point that Justices
Brennan and Stevens were making. As hostility and assertions of racial
superiority swirled around the heads of the freedmen in 1865 and 1866,
their need for protection was desperate. A return to 1866 and a careful
examination of the events of that period would have revealed a pattern of
racism that extends to the present day - a pattern that Michael Runyon
experienced and one that Brenda Patterson subsequently experienced.
The niceties and the precision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, however attractive it may be to ameliorate some problems, would
not be sufficient to deal with the experiences of the freedmen and Brenda
Patterson, and provide remedies for the foul deeds of harassment and
discrimination that dogged her in the workplace. One would have
thought that the very principle of stare decisis would have made the
Court more susceptible to the lessons of history. For the sake of Brenda
Patterson it seems a pity that the lawmakers of 1866 were more attentive
to the rights of the freedmen than the Court was to the rights of black
Americans in 1989.
78. Id. at 2372-73.
79. id. at 2374-75.
80. Id. at 2390.
81. Id. at 2396.
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